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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jonathan A. Collins appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to seal 
his criminal case file. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
During a videotaped police interview, Collins admitted he had used his hand to 
touch three-year-old A.T.'s vagina, over her clothing, for about one second. (Ex. 1, 
3:09:15 - 3:35:45.) Based on his admission, the state filed a Criminal Complaint 
charging Collins with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.6-
7.) Collins waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to district court. (R., 
p.25, 28-30.) Collins, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress his interview 
statements (R., pp.39-40), and a hearing was set for December 14, 2011 (R., p.63). 
The day before the hearing, the state filed a motion to dismiss the case, stating, "In the 
interest of justice, the State no longer wishes to proceed with this matterL]" which was 
granted. (R., pp.71-72.) 
Almost two years later, Collins filed a Motion to Seal Court Record, claiming 
"public access to [his] case has caused him financial hardship due to two prospective 
employers denying him employment because of his association with this case," and 
because "public access to this case might be libelous or threaten [his] safety[.]" (R., 
pp.74-81.) After a hearing, the district court denied Collins' motion to seal the court 
records in his dismissed case (R., pp.107-109; Tr., ppA-7), ruling that lithe public's 
interest in information and the government's obligation for transparency" outweighed 
1 
Collins' "need and desire to seal his court file" (R., p.108). Collins filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.102-104.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Collins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Collins' motion 
to seal his court record pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i)? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Collins failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his request to seal his criminal case file where it determined that the public interest in 
disclosure predominated over Collins' desire for privacy? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Collins Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying 
His Motion To Seal His Criminal Record 
A. Introduction 
Collins asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
to seal the criminal record in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-11.) Application of the 
correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows that the district court 
correctly recognized its discretion and exercised that discretion appropriately. Collins 
has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Decisions by the district court to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen, 147 
Idaho 869,872,216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009). 
C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Determining That The 
Public's Interest In Disclosure Predominated Over Any Of Collins' Purported 
Privacy Interests In Sealing His Criminal File 
Criminal judgments cannot be sealed absent the clearest showing of an 
overriding personal privacy interest without infringing on the public's constitutional right 
to information. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, in the context of 
criminal trials, the public has a right, protected by the First Amendment, to know what 
goes on in its courts. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 
(1980). The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment does not just 
protect expressing ideas and disseminating information, but receiving information and 
4 
ideas. See kL (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)); see also 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (right to publish implies a right to gather 
information). Indeed, "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and 
the self expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw." Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 
(1978)) (emphasis added). Criminal proceedings are, and have been since time 
immemorial, presumptively open. kL at 564-74. Therefore, "[a]bsent an overriding 
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 
kL at 581. 
Consistent with the public's constitutional right to know what transpires in criminal 
proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, "pursuant to [its] authority to control access to 
court records," promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32. I.C.A.R. 32(a). At the 
beginning of Rule 32, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly laid out its statement of policy: 
The public has a right to examine and copy the judicial department's 
declarations of law and public policy and to examine and copy the records 
of all proceedings open to the public. This rule provides for access in a 
manner that: 
(1) Promotes accessibility to court records; 
(2) Supports the role of the judiciary; 
(3) Promotes governmental accountability; 
(4) Contributes to public safety; 
(5) Minimizes the risk of injury to individuals; 
(6) Protects individual privacy rights and interests; 
(7) Protects proprietary business information; 
(8) Minimizes reluctance to use the court system; 
(9) Makes the most effective use of court and clerk of court 
staff; 
(10) Provides excellent customer service; and 
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Id. 
(11) Avoids unduly burdening the ongoing business of the 
judiciary. 
In the event of any conflict this rule shall prevail over any other rule 
on the issue of access to judicial records. 
Striking a balance between the public's constitutional right to access criminal 
records and the privacy interests of individuals, Rule 32 exempts from disclosure highly 
private information, such as PSis, most unreturned warrants, documents that would 
identify jurors on a Grand Jury, and jury questionnaires. I.C.A.R. 32(g). Duly entered 
criminal judgments, however, are not exempted from disclosure under Rule 32. 
In very narrow circumstances, court records may also be sealed under Rule 
32(i). The rule does not allow the district court unfettered discretion to seal case files; 
rather, a court is only allowed to seal portions of a case file after it finds that the 
petitioner's privacy interests predominate over the public's constitutional right to know. 
I,C.A.R. 32(i). Even then, U[i]f the court redacts or seals records to protect 
predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exemption from 
disclosure consistent with privacy interests." Id. Accordingly, before a district court may 
seal any portion of a case file, it must first determine in writing: 
(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or 
statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a 
reasonable person, or 
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that the court finds might be libelous, or 
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, 
the dissemination or publication of which would reasonably result in 
economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an interest in the 
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, records 
or public property of or used by the judicial department, or 
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Id. 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents 
or materials to preserve the right to a fair trial. 
Rule 32(i) "requires that the district court 'hold a hearing on the motion' and 
'determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or public 
disclosure predominates.'" State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504, 272 P.3d 474, 476 
(2012) (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)). The district court does not abuse its discretion by 
denying a motion to seal a criminal record after it determines that the public's interest in 
disclosure of the criminal proceedings predominates over the petitioner's asserted 
privacy interest. kL. at 504-505, 272 P.3d at 476-477. 
Collins moved the district court to seal his criminal file under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32(i), claiming that he suffered economic harm because "two 
prospective employers den[ied] him employment because of his association with this 
caseL]" and that "public access to this case might be libelous or threaten the safety of 
Mr. Collins." (R., p.74.) The district court, as required by Rule 32(i), held a hearing on 
Collins' motion. (Tr., pp.3-7.) No testimony was presented at the hearing, and no 
affidavit had been presented to support Collins' motion. (R., p.108 n.1.) The district 
court ruled from the bench that "having reviewed several times the motion to seal the 
court record, the applicable rules, the case law on point, I do believe that the public 
interest in looking at this court record outweighs Mr. Collins's [sic] desire and interest, 
economic interest, to have the court record sealed." (Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.) The district 
court subsequently entered an Order Denying Motion to Seal Court Record, and 
reiterated: 
7 
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to seal a court 
record is committed to the discretion of the district court. State v. Gurney, 
152 Idaho 502, 503, 272 P.3d 474, 475 (2012). The default position, as 
reflected in Idaho's public records law, is that all public records are open at 
all reasonable times for inspection. Idaho Code § 9-33S(1). It is 
Defendant's burden to overcome this presumption. Gurney, 152 Idaho at 
504, 272 P.3d at 476 n.1 (it is the moving party's burden to prove that 
court records should be sealed.) The defendant in this case did not meet 
his burden. [Footnote omitted.] 
The court weighed the public's interest in information and the 
government's obligation for transparency against the Defendant's need 
and desire to seal his court file. After weighing the competing interests, 
the Court denied Defendant's motion to seal the record. The Court noted 
that it would reconsider its ruling if the Defendant could show evidence 
that the prosecution had filed the charge in bad faith or for an improper 
purpose, or that probable cause did not exist at the time the charge was 
filed. 
(R., pp.107-10S.) In a footnote, the district court further explained that it "assumed for 
the purpose of deciding the motion that [Collins'] claims were true -- that [he] was 
challenged in finding employment and stigmatized by the accusation of a sex offense." 
(R., p.10S n.1.) The record shows that the district court weighed the public's interest in 
disclosure against Collins' interest in privacy. The district court properly exercised its 
discretion, and Collins has failed to show any abuse of that discretion. 
On appeal, Collins first asserts the district court abused its discretion by not 
adequately considering "that the documents or materials in [his] court records contain 
facts or statements that might be libelous[,]" including the Complaint and Information. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-S.) Collins specifically argues: 
[A.T.'s mother], the original source of the allegation against Mr. Collins had 
lied to police officers in the past. When viewed alongside the State's 
request that the district court dismiss the charge against [him] "in the 
interest of justice," a request that closely followed [his] giving notice of his 
intent to present evidence on [A.T.'s mother's] past lies, [her] history of 
lying indicates that she was also lying about Mr. Collins' alleged lewd 
S 
conduct. Thus, the statements that Mr. Collins committed the crime of 
lewd conduct are defamatory per se. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (citations to record omitted) (explanation added).) 
Collins' logic is flawed. Even assuming AT.'s mother lied to police in the past, it 
does not necessarily follow that she also lied about AT.'s statements in this case. Nor 
does the fact that Collins notified the state of his intent to present such evidence at trial 
render the state's subsequent dismissal of the case an "indicat[ion] that she was also 
lying about Mr. Collins' alleged lewd conduct."i (Id.) Moreover, in light of Collins' 
admission to Detective Heatherley that he had placed his hand on AT.'s vagina, outside 
her clothing for about one second, and immediately thought to himself, "Oh shit, what 
the fuck just happened" (Ex. 1, 3:09: 15 - 3:35:45), Collins' claims of libel and defamation 
ring hollow. 
Collins next argues the district court failed to adequately consider the financial 
loss he suffered "as a result of public access to the court records in this caseL]" as 
evidenced by "two prospective employers denying him employment because of his 
association with this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) If by "adequately consider" Collins 
means the district court did not understand his economic situation or weigh it against 
the state's interest in public access to court records, the record shows otherwise. As 
noted, the court verbally ruled, "having reviewed several times the motion to seal the 
court record, the applicable rules, the case law on point, I do believe that the public 
interest in looking at this court record outweighs Mr. Collins' desire and interest, 
1 It is just as likely that the state's motion to dismiss, filed December 13, 2011, was 
motivated by a perceived problem with prevailing at a suppression hearing, set one day 
later, on Collins' motion to suppress the statements he made during his police interview. 
(R., pp.39-40, 53-63, 71.) 
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economic interest, to have the court record sealed." (Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.) Simply 
because the district court did not give Collins' "negative economic impact" claim the 
weight he desires does not show that the court abused its discretion. 
Finally, Collins argues that, because he "regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous 
with parolees and probationers who, he fears, could harm him if they were to discover 
he had once been charged with a sex offense[,]" the district court should have sealed 
the court records. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Apart from being based on speculation, the 
record shows Collins' contention is incorrect. The district court explained at the hearing 
that it had "reviewed several times the motion to seal the court record" (Tr., p.5, LS.14-
20), which included Collins' assertion that he fears for his safety when he attends 
Alcoholics Anonymous (R., p.79). The district court's written order covered Collins' 
claim in general terms, explaining that, at the motion hearing, it had "weighed the 
public's interest in information and the government's obligation for transparency against 
the Defendant's need and desire to seal his court file[,]" and "[a]fter weighing the 
competing interests, the Court denied Defendant's motion to seal the record." (R., 
p.108.) 
Collins has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to seal his criminal case file. As recognized by Rule 32, the public's 
constitutional right to access criminal records H[cJontributes to public safety" and 
H[m]inimizes the risk of injury to individuals." See I.C.A.R. 32(a). The district court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying Collins' motion to seal the record of his criminal 
conviction after it correctly determined that Collins' privacy interests did not predominate 
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over the public's interest in disclosure. The district court's order denying Collins' motion 
to seal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Collins' motions to seal his criminal case file. 
DATED this 19th day of May, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy addressed to: 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender'S basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JCM/pm 
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